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1. INTRODUCTION: HARD TIMES FOR HARD WON IDEALS

The first decade of the new millennium was a bit hard on the rule of
law-national and transnational law alike-in some quarters of the U.S.
government. And as went those quarters of government, so went some
quarters of the legal academy. These years were nearly as hard on another
ideal, whose realization generally rides on that regularity and impartiality
which the rule of law works to secure. I refer in this case to joint
cooperative action among nations, as well as among sub-national
governmental units within nations, in addressing such critical collective
challenges as global terrorism, climate change, and financial fragility.
Examples on the government, as distinguished for now from the
academic side of this sorry story abound. Some hiring and firing decisions
taken by the U.S. Department of Justice in the early 2000s, for instance,

*
Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Review of Power and Purpose of
InternationalLaw by Mary Ellen O'Connell and Perils of Global Legalism by Eric Posner. Warn
thanks to Patrick O'Donnell for his thoughtful reactions and suggestions.

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

72

[Vol. 17:1

now appear to have been taken with a view less to the effective
administration of justice and combating of criminal threats than to partypolitical considerations-those of White House political director Karl Rove
in particular. Rove's aim, it now seems, was to secure unquestioning
cooperation from U.S. Attorneys in a plan to taint Democratic political
candidates with defendant status in meritless criminal investigations.' A
more late-Roman-Republican, or Soviet Communist Party, style departure
from efficient governance under "law, not men" could scarcely be
U.S. Attorneys were converted to function as Rove or
imagined.
Republican Partyattorneys.
As Rove and his cronies targeted political adversaries at home, others
in the White House moved illegally against Bush family enemies abroad.
Most conspicuous here was the U.S. military's being commandeered to
invade, occupy, and replace the government of another nation-state, Iraq,
without benefit either of United Nations (U.N.) authorization or of good
faith appeal to any imminent-or even serious-threat posed to the United
2
States or global order, as distinguished from George Walker's "daddy." it
also now looks as though White House attorneys, apparently viewing
domestic and transnational law much as Rove viewed the U.S. Department
of Justice, abetted the issuance of these orders through bizarre new readings
of operative legal standards.
Now lest one be misunderstood, it should be acknowledged at once
that it both was and is obvious that the Iraqi gangster-government of the
time was itself far more contemptuous of law, not to mention the most
minimal standards of human decency, than likely were any in the Bush

See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Eric Lipton, E-mail Reveals Rove's Key Role in '06 Dismissals,
1.
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/us/
politics/12firings.html?_r= (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
The allusion is to George W. Bush's apocryphal remark about Saddam Hussein's having
2.
tried to kill his "daddy." In fact Bush used the word "dad." For more on the long, complex history of
the Bush family feud with Hussein, for example, see Peter Baker, Conflicts Shaped Two Presidencies,
WASH. POST. (Dec. 31, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
12/30/AR2006123000663.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
3.

For a very helpful compilation on the morality of Bush-style preemptive war is

PREEMPTION: MILITARY ACTION AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION I (Henry Shue & David Rodin eds.,

2007). See also, e.g., Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, The Sources ofAmerican Legitimacy,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 18; Storer H. Rowley, Critics Say Bush Doctrine Might Provoke
First Strike, Ci. TRIB., June 24, 2002; Neta C. Crawford, Just War Theory and the United States
Counter-Terror War, I PERSP. ON POL. 5, 5 (Mar. 2003). For a nice sampling of essays on these
readings of applicable legal standards, see generally OPPOSING THE CRUSADER STATE: ALTERNATIVES

To GLOBAL INTERVENTIONISM (Carl P. Close & Robert Higgs eds., 2007); and for a treatise-length
analysis, HElKO MEIERTONS, THE DOCTRINES OF US SECURITY POLICY-AN EVALUATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 5 (2010).
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White House. Hence few tears ought-or are apt-to be spilt for that
government's functionaries, as distinguished from the legal and moral
standards to which they were indifferent if not hostile, when we look back
on these unhappy years. But pre-2003 Iraq had never been viewed as an
exemplar of rule of law ideals as had the United States, which, by showing
contempt for legality, could and did undermine legality.4
In this latter connection it was accordingly most unsettling of all to see
agents of the U.S. government, during the early 2000s, also beginning in
some cases to resemble the very criminals they had unlawfully acted more
or less unilaterally to depose. I allude to the emergence and now steady
accumulation of evidence that officers of the U.S. military and intelligence
services might, along with sundry mercenaries whose services they
apparently unlawfully retained, have engaged in illegal detentions,
"extraordinary renditions," systematic prisoner abuse, extra-judicial
killings, and even torture.5 These actions, if taken by or with the approval
of U.S. government functionaries-including, once again, lawyers-will
likely be judged ultimately to have shown more contempt for domestic and
international law on the part of our own agents than virtually any action
taken since the nineteenth century by American custodians of this
quintessentially American ideal, the rule of law.
II. THE HARD TIMES AS MADE TO LOOK GOOD
Now where there is contempt for impartially applicable legal standards
and associated behavioral regularity, one generally also finds varyingly
vulgar, and sometimes sophistical if not quite sophisticated, attempts to
"rationalize" the contemptuous behavior in question. These attempts
typically take certain familiar forms, two of which are particularly often
encountered.
Exemplars of one such form, historically favored by "rogue,"
"brigand," or "regime-challenging" states like the Soviet Union, Fascist
Italy, and Nazi Germany in the twentieth century, or Saddamite Iraq and
theocratic Iran in the early twenty-first century, question the operative
standards themselves. The "rogue" in these cases dismisses the salient rules
or principles as little more than calcified class or status advantages of one
sort or another, masquerading as universally applicable and impartially
administered law. The "rogue" might even dismiss the cognate ideals of
4.
For example, witness Russia's proffered justification of its 2008 invasion of Georgia,
South Ossetia Conflict FAQs, RItA NOVOSTI (Sept. 17, 2008), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080917/
I 16929528.htrnl (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
See, e.g., Ali K. Soufan, What Torture Never Told Us, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at WK9,
5.
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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impartiality, cooperation, and the rule of law themselves altogether, as little
more than fantasy or delusion. "All is power," he might say, in a vaguely
Nietzschean vein, "and the workings thereof. All else is ideological
superstructure at best and mendacity at worst." We do not usually hear
words like these from Americans, but read on.
Exemplars of another time-honored form of self-justification heard
from law-breakers purport to show that alleged violations were not "really"
legal violations at all. And it is this form that seems to have found
particular favor among former U.S. government officials in connection with
the infractions mentioned above. Members of the Bush administration
whose names are now household words, for example, wrote certain now
notorious memoranda purporting to show that deplored practices engaged
in or authorized by American military and intelligence personnel did not
count as torture under applicable statutes and international conventions.
Other spokespeople for the administration, alluded to above, argued that the
illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq was a legitimate act of "selfdefense," in response to a "grave and gathering" threat, under international
custom and convention. And still others maintain even today with straight
faces that, since a president may legally dismiss all U.S. Attorneys at any
time even for no reason, it cannot be violative of domestic legal standards
to dismiss some such attorneys selectively for any reason. 8
Attempted self-justifications of this second form, while often amusing
or perhaps darkly comical, are usually less disturbing than those of the first
form. For just as hypocrisy might be thought of as vice's tribute to virtue,
so can "hail mary" attempts at self-justification, and frivolous claims of
legality, at least be thought backhanded compliments paid law. And
contempt for law taking the form of "rationalized" illegal behavior, even
when exhibited by present-day functionaries of that first modern
government framed with a view to the ideal of government under "law, not
men," is at any rate just more familiarto us than is contempt for law taking
the form of outright rejection of law. We see less extreme instances of this
form of contempt, after all, all the time-notably among our own children
in their more casuistic moments.
See, e.g., Harold Koh, No Torture, No Exceptions, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 2008),
6.
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.kob.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2010); John W. Dean, The Torture Memo by Judge Jay S. Bybee that Haunted Alberto Gonzales's
Confirmation Hearings, FINDLAW, (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dean/20050114.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
7.
See, e.g., Jim Garamone, Iraq 'a Grave and GatheringDanger,' Bush Tells U.N., U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF. NEWS, (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id-43466 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
8. See, e.g., Lichtblau & Lipton, supra note 1.
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It is presumably for reasons such as these that so many practitioners
and scholars of international law-American and otherwise-reacted with
consternation when two members of that institution through which lawgoverned societies often most carefully examine, critique, and work to
improve themselves-the legal academy-published a book amidst the
Bush years purporting to justify unilateralism and lawlessness of the sorts
instanced above. For the justifying in this case took the form, not of the
second--"it was actually lawful"-variety, but of the first-"there is no
law here"-variety: the variety favored by "rogues." And in this case it
was not simply government functionaries seeking a free hand, but legal
scholars whose hands never were bound, who were doing the law-denying.
III. AN ATrEMPTED ASSIST FROM THE LEGAL ACADEMY
I refer of course to Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner's unfortunate
Limits of International Law (Limits) published in 2005.9 Here a set of
remarkably casual, pseudo-scientific proto-arguments purported to show,
not that the Bush administration had in fact acted in keeping with
transnational legal standards during its early years, but that transnational
legality itself is in large part just epiphenomenal or mere bunk. 0 We were
told it amounted to a sort of ingeniously elaborate hoax, shimmering
hologram-like over legitimately venal interactions among states, foisted
upon leaders, lawyers, diplomats, and professors by those leaders, lawyers,
And while one might have
diplomats, and professors themselves."
expected accusations this remarkable to be supported by some remarkably
heavy new brand of methodological artillery, all that Goldsmith and Posner
proffered in Limits was a thin sort of "dumbed-down" rendition of stale
rational choice theory, the genuine article of which appeared to lie beyond

their ken.12
Now it is of course possible that the field of international law
scholarship simply looked ripe for the taking by people of the Goldsmith
and Posner persuasion-somewhat, perhaps, as the native populations of
North America might have looked ripe for the conquering by guns,
smallpox, and brightly colored beads as once brought to this continent by
9.

JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (2005)

[hereinafter LIMrTs]. For a full review essay on this work, see Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their
World, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1720, 1729-39 (2006) [hereinafter Limits of Their World].
10.

See Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at 1720-23.

11.

Id.

12.
On the crudity and ultimate tautologousness of Goldsmith and Posner's Cliff's Notes style
rational choice theory in comparison to proper rational choice theory, see Limits of Their World, supra
note 9, at 1729-44, 1746-62, 1770-75.
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European invaders of centuries past. For international law practice and
scholarship had not yet been colonized, as had some fields of law, by those
forms of rational choice and game-theoretic analysis long familiar to price
theory, microeconomics, and even most government or "political science"
faculties. And so anyone plausibly purporting to bring this putatively heavy
equipment to bear for the first time on international law scholarship-as
professors at the University of Chicago might be expected to be equipped to
do-stood some chance of cowing or wowing the old-timers into
submission.
The attempted beachhead in this instance failed, however, as the
natives refused to be taken in. And this seems to have been principally
because rather than gunpowder and contagious disease, the book quite
transparently carried more in the way of shiny glass beads than real
weaponry.
For one thing, it was clear that the authors themselves did not fully
understand the "models"-as they called them-and methods that they
purported to introduce.' 3 Nor, for that matter, had they apparently given
much thought to what is meant by the word "law" in domestic or
transnational contexts, or to what theories, qua theories, are meant to
accomplish.14 Nor, relatedly, had the authors apparently bothered to
consider what plausible meta-theoretic criteria of theoretic success might
look like.15 These were troubling lacunae in a work that professed to break
new theoretical ground. The ultimate upshot was that, notwithstanding the
authors' repeated claims to be proffering a "better theory" of international
law than could be had from the "traditional" scholars they never cited but
incessantly slighted, the book never managed to present anything in the way
of a theory at all. It struck the pose of the brash newcomer without ever
managing to do much of anything, let alone anything new-a "Clay versus
Liston" circa 1964, one might say, save without Clay's ever getting round
to stepping into the ring.' 6
For another thing, as an empirical rather than foundational matter, the
authors of Limits did not appear to have spent much time learning the
13.

See Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at 1729-39. See also infra Part XI.

14.

See Limits of Their World, supranote 9, at 1723-29.

15.

See id.

16.
I am, of course, referring to the Muhammad Ali of the early 1960s, who then went by the
name "Cassius Clay." Clay's incessant barrage of poetically rendered insults, wild predictions of
glorious victory, and generally manic comportment in the weeks leading up to his first heavyweight bout
with the then-reigning champ, Sonny Liston, led many to speculate that he was either bluffing or was so
fearful as to have been led into suffering a sort of psychological breakdown-until he delivered the
See, e.g., YouTube, http-/www.youtube.con/
goods by knocking out Liston, twice.
watch?v=iyhqZNcF9pM&feature=related (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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details of the few international legal rules, principles, r6gimes, institutions
and "case studies" to which they purported to "apply" their never
completed proto-theory. Little of which they spoke proved recognizable to
people familiar with international law, international institutions, recent
events, or the historical record. Instead one found misshapen vignettes and
pastiches apparently cobbled together and "photoshopped," as it were, with
no evident object but to lend post hoc plausibility to the book's few
purportedly empirical claims."
But what was most damning of all in connection with Limits, in
consequence of the foundational errors just enumerated, was its sheer
sterility-both positive and normative sterility alike. The book was entirely
empty as a would-be generator either of nontrivial descriptive hypotheses
amenable to empirical investigation, or of a coherent empirical research
agenda. It was likewise empty as would-be generator of prescriptive
recommendations, usefully informed by empirics and coherent normative
ideals, aimed at improving the global order and the lives of the people who
must live with it. The book offered neither "hard facts," nor "hard headed"
understandings of facts derived through the medium of coherent theory, nor
any realistic hope that the global community or its members might act to
redeem. It offered only repetitive side-swipes at "traditional international
law scholars" for their failure to realize what Goldsmith and Posner's ersatz
theoretics purportedly could have told them at any time from the Creation
on down to the present: that they were deluding themselves in believing or
acting as though anything we might call "international law" could or ought
to exert anything like "normative pull" upon anyone who acts in the name
of a polity."
In consequence of its theoretic vacuity, descriptive inaccuracy, and
prescriptive sterility, Limits quickly found itself quarantined as if it were a
strange new variety of antigen in the body of international law scholarship,
with a fast-growing hedge of reviews and review essays playing the
salutary role of antibodies.' 9 Some pointed out that there actually already
was a very well developed international law and international relations
literature informed by an understanding of rational choice and game

17.

See Limits of Their World, supranote 9, at 1744-46, 1762-69.

18.

See id. at 1739-42, 1746-48.

19. Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at 1739; Detlev Vagts, InternationalRelations Looks
at Customary InternationalLaw: A Traditionalist'sDefense, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1031, 1031 (2004);
Greg Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary InternationalLaw Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541,
541 (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of InternationalLaw, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 534 (2006);
Symposium: The Limits of InternationalLaw, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 passim (2006). There
are, of course, many more.
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theoretic modeling much more complete than that on display in Limits. 20
These critics also pointed out that this literature, surprisingly un-cited by
Limits, did not impugn the normativity, effectiveness, or longer term
potential of international law at all, but in fact both endorsed it and offered
means of improving it.2 1
Some critics also observed that another very rich literature on
international law, again strangely un-cited by Limits, supplemented
unavoidably coarse-grained rational choice and game theoretic modeling
with more fine-grained sociological modeling.2 2 They also noted that this
literature rendered it all the more evident not only that international law
expresses and exerts normative force, but both how it does so and how its
influence is now steadily deepening even as it continues to widen.23
Finally, some reviewers pointed out the remarkable number of theoretic
incoherencies, conceptual blunders, and plain factual inaccuracies vitiating
Limits, to which I alluded a moment ago.24 The quarantining and curative
work attracted by Limits, then, was happily thorough.
What had not yet been done, however-up until now-was to step
back, take stock, and begin afresh in comprehensively assessing the place,
the performance, and above all the potential of international law as a once
again rapidly developing mode of collective ordering at the start of a new
century. I say "until now" because this is precisely what Mary Ellen
O'Connell's new monograph, The Power & Purpose of International Law
(Power & Purpose), both sets out to accomplish and largely succeeds in
accomplishing. 25 The work would seem destined to fill-and fill admirably
-the space left by Limits' near immediate flameout, as the international
legal scholar's and practitioner's state-of-the-art surview of our shared
global project.
IV. A PROPER HOUSE CLEANING: RECOVERING LAW, THE
RULE OF LAW, AND LAW'S PRINCIPLED, PURPOSEFUL POWER

Power & Purpose earns plaudits in virtue of several mutually
complementary characteristics in particular. The book manifests, first, a
thorough familiarity with the actual workings-both as formally prescribed
20.

See Limits of Their World, supranote 9, at 1738-41.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.
See, e.g., id. at 1741. The allusion is to the remarkable body of work by Goodman and
Jinks cited therein, and subsequently extended by further work cited infra.
24.

See generally Limits of Their World, supranote 9, at 1738.

25.

MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16

(2008).
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and as practically executed-of those principal standards, regimes, and
institutions through which orderly transnational cooperation and the
international law to which that cooperation gives rise are effected. The
book manifests, second, an equally thorough familiarity with the
understandings of both past and contemporary scholars, practitioners, and
scholar-practitioners of international law as to what it is they do, critique,
and all the while work to improve. Both of these characteristics lend the
book weight as a contribution, in its own right, to the further development
of international law and its scholarship with a view to more fully realizing
the purposes of these salutary and mutually complementary enterprises.
But what is most distinctive of all about Power & Purpose, in this
reviewer's estimation, is its simultaneously encyclopedic and synthetic
grasp of the cohesive long term history of international law and its selfcritical self-improvement through the interpretive work of scholarpractitioners. One comes away from reading the book with much more
than admiration for Professor O'Connell's impressive erudition. One
comes away with a renewed sense of well-tempered hope for the world and
its struggling inhabitants. For one sees in this work both how far the global
rule of law and its self-improvement through self-critical practice have
come, and how regularly the same dreary nay-saying and power-exalting
that characterized Limits have been registered, and discarded, along the
way. Transnational law's "nattering nabobs of negativism" 2 6 -the likes of
Hobbes, Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and a smattering of others over the
centuries-turn out to be as old as transnational law itself, as well as a great
deal more crude in their understanding of human action and aspiration.
V. NULLA LEGE SINE POENA? WE'VE HEARD IT BEFORE. 27
Its pretensions to methodological novelty notwithstanding, Limits
sought much of its purchase by trading on a very old, long-discredited
canard. This was the idea, to put the point only marginally more crudely
than Limits did, that because nothing like Tim LaHaye's peculiar fantasies
have yet been realized-there are no Blue Helmets in Black Helicopters yet
bombing or shooting or clubbing Americans into submission-there is no
international "law" worth the name.28 The conclusion follows on the
26. In honor of William Safire, a kind man recently deceased, who coined this phrase on
behalf of then Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.
27.

And we have heard it in spite of the fact that the maxim properly reads, "Nulla Poena Sine

Lege."
28.
The allusion is to TIM LAHAYE & JERRY B. JENKINS, ARMAGEDDON (2003), wherein the
Secretary General of the U.N. turns out to be the world-tyrannizing "Antichrist" who stars in the
Biblical Book of Revelation, read by some "fundamentalists" as a literal forecast of life in the End
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premise only in the thinking of those who hold wildly implausible, crabbed
and clunky conceptions of "law"-conceptions that call to mind the
Austinian picture of law as the "command" of a unitary sovereign backedup by threat of physical violence that the sovereign is able to wield. Had
they paused to consider what law actually consists in, Goldsmith and
Posner, as well as their comparatively few predecessors in skepticism,
might well have spared themselves a good bit of avoidable blunder.
Very few people, it turns out-particularly in the academy-hold to
the clunky Austinian picture of law on reflection, 29 and we learn in Power
& Purpose that very few historically have. It also turns out, however, that
the "no law without violence" idea nevertheless acts as a sort of hardy
perennial weed-regularly gestured to by those who are blind to the order
implicit in the garden, and just as regularly pulled out and put to the
compost by those more careful gardeners who prevail in legal practice and
scholarship. Power & Purpose is particularly learned, first, in its narrative
account of the intellectual history of this familiar dialectic, and second, in
its account of the dialectic's interaction with actual law practice. Part I of
the book is devoted primarily to the first account, Part II to the second,
though the two Parts for good reason cross-refer. I shall accordingly by and
large discuss them together, in tribute to that integration that Power &
Purpose itself ultimately works.
With respect to the first story, Professor O'Connell reminds us over
the course of Chapters One through Three that it has never been seriously
denied by anyone-certainly not by international lawyers or legal
scholars-that laws which do not merely describe physical events in the
"laws of nature" sense, but prescribe human action in the "natural and
positive law" sense, always implicate possible sanction. 30 That is just part
of what it is to say not only that something tends, as a positive matter, often
to occur or be done, but that it is, as a normative matter, required to be
done. For with any express or implied "ought" claim comes an
understanding that action in contravention of the claim is an apt occasion
for opprobrium. And opprobrium is something that tends generally to find
some form of expression. The menu of such forms, for its part, is much

Times prior to Christ's final return to reign over the earth. One reckons that, say, Dag Hammarskjold
and some other Secretaries General might nearly have inclined graciously to thank LaHaye for the
complimentary imputation of consequentiality to their office, even while disavowing any interest in
clubbing anyone.
29. Not even those modem revivers of legal positivism, Kelsen and Hart. See ROBERT
HocKETr, THE LITTLE BOOK OF BIG IDEAS: LAW 86, 90 (2009).
30.

O'CONNELL, supranote 25, at 19-98.
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richer even within domestic legal systems than international law skeptics
seem in general to have noticed.'
What the comparatively small number of Ockhamites, Hobbesians,
Machiavellians, Austinians and their ilk over time seem with depressing
regularity to have missed, we learn in Power & Purpose, is that manifest
opprobrium always has taken both a great variety of forms and a great
many varying degrees of force. Careful scholars, especially those with
experience in transnational legal practice, have long known this; a few
armchair nay-sayers have just as consistently missed it. Sanction, in short,
comes both in many guises and in many intensities. The task for
transnational lawyers and legal scholars has accordingly never been to
announce the lack of an international police force, international Gestapo, or
international Blackwater as if this were a discovery, but to seek more and
better means of affording both fairer and more orderly modes of collective
action-action taken under the rule of law-to persons and their various
stratified, sub-global units of government worldwide than we have managed
thus far.
Now, what such means for rendering collective action fairer and more
orderly might we have? And what forms short of and additional to
organized violence do law and law's sanctions generally take? The variety
of both, once you begin looking around, can be dazzling; and Power &
Purpose should serve as a salutary indicator even for those who have
already noticed. Sanctions, for their part, range from as little as a
disappointed shake of the head or more forceful show of disgust, to
piecemeal remonstrance or denunciation, to more systematic shaming or
shunning or isolating, to ad hoc or more systematic material deprivations of
various sorts and with varying degrees of severity, all the way on to
physical restraint and the credible threat of outright physical violence or
violence itself, be that in turn of a limited "surgical" nature or more. As
Power & Purpose makes clear, this same variety of forms has always been
with us not only in international legal sanctioning regimes, but in domestic
ones too.
Practitioners and scholars of international law, for their part, just as
practitioners and scholars of domestic law themselves not so long ago were,
have long been aware of this great multiplicity of forms, while
transnational actors have availed themselves, in various instances, of all of
them. The principal difference between the domestic and international
cases is simply that well coordinated sanctioning is more hard won in the
latter case than in the former-just as it was in the domestic case itself in

31.

In this connection, for example, see Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at 1756-57.
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not so distant times, before the coalescence of localities into larger polities
called "nation states" was complete.32
Power & Purpose effectively drives this point home in parallel surveys
of intellectual (Part I) and practical (Part II) legal history that commence
with classical antiquity and run down to the present day.
We are
reminded that at least as early as the time of Aristotle-in fact, I would
argue, that of the pre-Socratics 34 -and proceeding through those of Cicero,
Augustine, Aquinas, Bartolus, Belli, the Spanish Scholastics, Grotius, and
more modem legal theorists such as Jellinek, Triepel, Oppenheim, Kelsen,
Lauterpacht, Henkin, and even Hart-the dominant view among lawyers,
judges, legal thinkers, and social theorists has been that there are standards
very much in the nature of laws that bind even those who purport to be
Two deeply connected features of such standards bear
sovereigns.
particular notice here. I shall call them the substantive and formal
characteristics of these standards' contents on the one hand, and the two
senses in which these standards can be said to bind on the other.
VI. WHEN IS IT "LAW," AND WHEN IS IT "RULE OF LAW?"

The substantive contents of the standards discussed in Power &
Purpose have, unsurprisingly, typically tended to reflect the economic,
social, and political characteristics of their times. Hence because, until
fairly recently, interactions between citizens of different states tended
largely to be limited to those between citizens acting as martial or
diplomatic agents of states, and because most such interactions in past
times concerned matters of dynastic succession and territorial jurisdiction,
transnational legal standards used mainly to speak in such manner as to
restrain state agents from employing coercive instrumentalities of state for
any purposes that were not "just." "Just causes" in these cases, for its part,
meant either resistance to aggression-usually, resistance to attempts to
upset settled territorial boundaries-or the restoration of some peaceful
semblance of the status quo ante, or both.
By the same token, as interactions between citizens of different states
in the modem era have steadily "thickened" and intensified to embrace
indefinitely more sorts of transaction than invasion, war, and threats
thereof, so has the variety of contents that make up transnational legal
standards. As even the casual reader of newspapers, let alone the domestic
32.
And in some cases, of course, even the latter coalescence is far from complete. The most
conspicuous instance today is doubtless Afghanistan.
33.

O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 17-98, 151-368.

34.

See, e.g., HOCKETr, supranote 29, at 62.

35.

See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 21-26.
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or transnational legal practitioner now knows, there are transnationally
operative legal standards that speak to everything from genocide to slavery
to child labor to telecommunications to drug trafficking to money
laundering to bank and financial regulation to trade restrictions to torture
to-soon, one hopes-even carbon emissions and more. Thicker relating
across borders just naturally gives rise to denser webs of agreed regularity
and "ground rule"-law-operative across borders.
It is hardly surprising that as more and more previously local
challenges spill across increasingly porous borders to become global
challenges, the contents of transnational legal standards grow as well. The
same phenomenon, after all, is familiar to Americans in their domestic
capacity, who as their nation grew steadily more economically and socially
integrated over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
saw more and more erstwhile local or state concerns become state and
federal concerns. And of course a counterpart such development is now
well underway in Europe. Law tends to "federalize" as political localities
themselves steadily integrate economically, socially, culturally, and
ultimately even politically. What today we call "transnational" law would
in many ways have embraced, only a bit more than two hundred years ago,
much of what was legislated first in Philadelphia, then briefly in New York,
and then finally in Washington, to the citizens of such disparate "states" as
Massachusetts and South Carolina in the early American national period.
Now in what sense have such polity-straddling standards,
notwithstanding their varying substantive contents and, relatedly, their
rootedness in particular stages of economic, social, and political
development, all been "law-like?" Here the answer is found less in the
substantive contents of the legal standards, than in those formal
characteristics constitutive of that elusive ideal known as the "rule of law."
What are those characteristics? Well, the two that I have repeatedly
referenced above are impartiality and regularity, and it is time now that I
should say why. What, then, do impartiality and regularity have to do with
that evidently widely shared human ideal known as "the rule of law?""

36. As I wrote the first draft of this review essay, Ireland had just signed on to a streamlined
new "constitution" of Europe known as the "Lisbon Treaty," which came into force before year's end.
See, e.g., Ireland Back's EU's Lisbon Treaty, BBC NEwS, (Oct. 3, 2009), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi8288181.stm (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
37. For evidence on the degree to which this ideal is-and long has been-widely shared in
the human community, see HOCKETr,supra note 29, at 10.
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VII. "HIGHER LAW," "NATURAL LAW," AND "THE MORAL LAW" AS
CONSTITUTIVE OF THE PRINCIPLED RULE OF LAW

The role that impartiality and regularity play in constituting the rule of
law ideal, and hence the contents of standards that can properly be called
"laws," is best introduced by reference to that from which the rule of law
typically is contradistinguished: that is, of course, the morally arbitrary
"rule of men." We extol "governments of laws, not men." And there is a
very good reason for this. The reason that the "rule of men" is found
normatively wanting, I suggest, is that it entails acquiescence in a very
simple and ultimately normatively unacceptable proposition: that is the
proposition that some persons are simply entitled (in a seldom if ever
critically considered sense of "entitled"), by dint of no more than hereditary
or other unearned hence morally arbitrary status, to subordinate other
persons' will to their own wills, while their own wills go unsubordinated to
anything-principled or otherwise.
Where I am able to subordinate your will to mine without reference to
any standard that binds both of our wills, I cannot properly be said even to
prescribeaction, let along legally or legitimately prescribe action, to you at
all.38
The proper word in such cases is not "prescription," but
"conscription." 39 The arbitrary commander conscripts the wills of others,
and in so doing sets herself "above" and apart from those others-as if she
were the deity as conceived by medieval voluntarists, answerable to nothing
and no one. This is what is meant by a "government of men" as
distinguished by a government of laws.
Now the realm in which the rule of law prevails, by contrast, is that in
which all willing-including the willing of those who command-is done
pursuant to principles. And the principles in question are principles that
bind and/or bound the will of the commander as fully as they do the wills of
the commanded. They are in that sense formally constitutive of the will of
that commander, and accordingly render that will morally intelligible.
Rather than as the voluntarist deity, those who will where the rule of law is
operative will as does the natural lawyers' deity-the deity of Aquinas
rather than Ockham. 4 0 But now what is it to will pursuant to a principle,
and hence to will with "legitimate"-the word of course is suggestiveprescriptive authority rather than merely conscriptive pretension?
38.
See Robert Hockett, *y Paretians Can't Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and
Imperatives in Law and Policy, 18 CORNELL J. L. & POL'Y 391, 392 (2009) [hereinafter Paretians].
39.

Id.

40. For more on the linkage between voluntarism, unprincipled conscription, and ultimately
legal positivism, see Robert Hockett, Reflective Intensions: Two Foundational Decision Points in
Mathematics, Law, and Economics, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967, 2060 (2008).
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Elsewhere I have suggested that the answer to this question is found in
three forms of logical generality, which correspond to three "variables"
opened by any imperatival utterance underwritten by a reason. 4 1 It will be
helpful briefly to reprise these forms of generality here. For they are
constitutive, I believe, of all legitimate prescription as distinguished from
arbitrary conscription, hence of all genuinely authoritative law. In that
sense they are internal to our idea of law and our ideal of the "rule of law"
themselves, whether the "law" we have in mind be considered domestically
or transnationally--or for that matter even personally.
The first form of generality to which I refer, then, is what I call the
"situational" generality of the reason that underwrites an imperatival
utterance-the range of circumstances in which the reason would be
implicated and the utterance thus apt. This form of generality, which is
closely bound up with autonomy-literally, "self-legislation"-in action, is
what makes a principled imperative of what would otherwise be a merely
ad hoc decision to act or command; the sort of thing even very young,
unreflective children and nonhuman animals can do or follow, respectively.
This form of generality is also, accordingly, closely bound up with the
"regularity" to which I have referred above-the root regula here
unsurprisingly being the same root we find in such words as "regulate" and
even "reign" and "rule." Those who are fit legitimately to govern must first
be fit to self-govern, and to self-govern is to self-regulate-to act upon
reasons for action that are applicable in multiple circumstances. Such
reasons are just what we call "principles." They bear situational generality.
The other two forms of generality to which I refer are jointly
constitutive not simply of the "regularity" characteristic of all principles,
but the "impartiality" characteristic of authoritative moral or ethical
principles. One of these forms I call "recipient" generality. The other I call
"beneficiary" generality. A reasoned imperative grows in respect of its
recipient generality as the class of those who are putatively subject to it
grows. It grows in respect of its beneficiary generality as the class of those
on behalf of whose well-being it is putatively rendered grows. The
maximal degree of generality in either case would be full universality-the
kind of universality that renders the Golden Rule "golden." 4 2 And the ideal
of ethical impartiality, I believe, just is the ideal of universality along both
of those dimensions-those of the recipient and beneficiary classes of
imperatival utterances underwritten by bona fide moral reasons. It is the
41.

See Paretians,supra note 38, at 420-42.

42. "Do unto others as you would they do unto you." The "you" here, naming recipients,
means everyone. The "others," naming beneficiaries, means everyone too. The maximal degree of
universality is that in which the recipient and beneficiary classes, embracing everyone, coincide. See id.
at 432-40.
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ideal pursuant to which all persons are equally subject to an imperative, and
equally apt to benefit by everyone's acting in conformity to it.
Now to say that a standard is a bonafide "legal" or "law-like" standard
in the senses intended by thoughtful lawyers, I think, just is to say that it
bears the three forms of prescriptive generality just sketched-hence that it
bears the features of regularity and impartiality associated with those forms
of generality. It is to say that the standard is uniformly applicable in all
morally relevantly similar circumstances, is morally binding upon all who
might find themselves in those circumstances, and works to the benefit of
all who might be affected by those who act in those circumstances. In such
cases the standard is in an apt sense "above" all of us, and we are all of us
in this sense treated as moral "equals" under the standard in question.
Putative rules that not only are posited as "positive laws" by persons
purporting to bear the authority to posit them, but that also tend to be
treated as legitimately authoritative by large numbers of people over time,
are conspicuous in the degree to which they feature these three forms of
generality. And we see here a link to the next question I said I would take
up-that of the sense in which laws might "bind."
So in what sense has the unbroken chain of legal as well as social
theorists from Aristotle on down to the present, as surveyed by Professor
O'Connell in Power & Purpose, taken law-like standards to bind even those
who purport to be sovereigns? Well, as it happens, in both senses that we
tend even today to take even domestic law to bind citizens-the senses of
moral obligatoriness on the one hand and practical suasion on the other.
As for the first, moral obligatoriness, this is a straightforward
outgrowth of the formal features of prescriptive content just sketched. As
putative standards attain to regularity and impartiality in the senses
unpacked above-that is to say, as they come to bear situational, recipient,
and beneficiary generality in high degree-they take on moral authority. It
becomes not simply "bad form" to act inconsistently with them, but "bad"
simpliciter. It becomes wrongful. For to act inconsistently with them is to
act as if one were inherently "better than" or "more privileged" than others,
rightfully entitled to conscript their wills or their equal entitlements. It is to
take what is properly somebody else's-her will, her body, her territory, or
other entitlement-and treat it as if it were legitimately one's own. The
Golden Rule, as perhaps the most compactly general articulation of those
features of universality characteristic of all morally obligatory standards,
quickly throws into bold relief the sense in which that is so. And so it is
presumably no surprise that the Golden Rule has both figured prominently
in moral and natural law treatises through history, and formed a prototype
for the Kantian "categorical imperative."
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Against this backdrop it is striking that the content of most
transnational legal standards that we actually find both historically and
today, a broad sampling of which are discussed through Part II of Power &
Purpose, can straightforwardly be interpreted as initially halting, then
gradually improving efforts made at prescribing action on the basis of
reasons bearing the three forms of generality discussed above in high
degree, hence as efforts at formulating legitimately binding obligations
binding on all people-including those professing to be sovereigns, or
agents acting in the name of sovereign peoples-worldwide. For of course
no such stated norm ever has been claimed, even by the most cynical of
political actors espousing or defending it, to be applicable only once, or
binding only upon one or a few rather than all sovereigns, or to work for the
benefit only of one or a few rather than all sovereigns. And by the same
token most challenges to such norms have taken the form of claims to the
effect that in fact they are merely ad hoc or do operate to the sole or
disproportionate advantage of only one or a few privileged people. (That,
recall, was noted above to be one form canonically taken by "rogue"
challengers of international norms).
Insofar as transnational legal standards are to be faulted as falling short
of the rule of law ideal, then, it can only be owing either to the plausibility
of challenges like those just mentioned in particular instances, or to the
plausibility of another form of challenge that I myself have adduced
elsewhere: I mean the imperative that we ultimately improve international
legal standards in keeping with the moral truth that all human beings bear
equal rights to equal material opportunity to flourish. The ultimate subjects
and beneficiaries of the impartiality and regularity ideals that constitute the
rule of law ideal, in other words, are people, who ought-as they
increasingly now do-gradually take their place alongside, and ultimately
perhaps even replace, states as the proper subjects of transnational law.
States, in other words, both ought and increasingly do serve principally as
proxies for human persons in transnational law. And the task for
international law is accordingly best viewed-and increasingly is viewedas that of bringing a true rule of law first to those proxies, and ultimately to
those on whose behalves the proxies themselves are meant to act. We
cannot reach that rightful end state without interpreting and improving the
present state in keeping with it.4 3
In this sense, the enterprise that is transnational law is both best, and
readily, seen as an effort, however initially halting it inevitably must be, at
extending the enterprise that is domestic-first local, then "federal"--law

43.
1720.

This is the principal "positive" message of my Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at
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itself outward to the farthest reaches of all law's inherently universalist
aspirations. For domestic legal development too is quite clearly animated,
as is manifest in its history, by the ultimate aim of vindicating the equal
dignity and equal opportunity rights of all people. It is animated, that is, by
something like "natural law," "higher law," or "moral law" ideals, as I will
explain presently. And insofar as the national and transnational legal
enterprises succeed, they simply succeed at formulating standards that
already are binding, morally speaking, irrespective of how consistently
people actually manage to behave morally and thus act in conformity with
them, positively speaking. But more of this presently, when I turn briefly to
some of the many examples from the actual practice of transnational law
that Power & Purpose with admirable comprehensiveness adduces.
Now against this backdrop of bona fide law's formal features, the
close historical association that we find between the theory and practice of
transnational law on the one hand, and those of "higher law," "natural law,"
and even Kantian or immediately pre-Kantian "moral law" on the other, is
rendered immediately intelligible. Because the sources of transnational law
have historically lacked any unitary earthly "focal point"-such as, say, a
singular secular sovereign-from which they can be taken to proceed,
transnational legal argumentation, be it in treatises, international
negotiations, or courtrooms, has had to appeal directly and transparentlyto
"higher law" or "first principles." Domestic legal argumentation, as I will
note presently, has in the last century or so come to enjoy the luxury of less
direct or transparent such appeal-all while ultimately relying upon such
appeal nonetheless.
In this light it is in no way surprising that transnational legal theorists
and practitioners-the likes of Suarez, Grotius, and Wolff-have tended so
often to be renowned ethicists as well as lawyers, while the best known
skeptics of transnational law-the likes of Hobbes and Machiavelli-have
tended to be notorious immoralists as well." The historical interplay
between these pairs of associated tradition-the higher law/transnational
law tradition on the one hand, the immoralist/transnational law skeptical
tradition on the other-is a story that Power & Principle narrates with great
sweep and verve. It is, in my estimation, one of the principal strengths of
Part I of the book,45 though I believe the book would be even stronger had it
drawn out a bit more explicitly the continuity between natural law in its

44.

See, e.g., HOCKEPTr, supra note 29, passim.

45.

See O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 17-149.
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final modern, Wolffian articulation on the one hand, and the Kantian
"moral law" tradition rooted in Wolff's work itself on the other.46
It also perhaps bears more notice even than Power & Principle affords
us that the best legal arguments concerning domestic law typically also do
what transnational legal arguments often have done. For those arguments
typically aim to distill the sensible, salutary, morally worthwhile purposes
that positive laws typically are meant to advance. Or they appeal to the
ultimately more-than-merely-posited moral-political legitimacy of the
lawmaking organ.4 8 Or they do both. And when they do so, they are of
course doing more than merely pointing to documents with insignias or
seals embossed on them. They are appealing to "first principles." They are
appealing effectively to "higher law.A 9
All that actually differs as between the transnational and domestic
cases, then, so far as canonical forms of argumentation are concerned, is
that in the latter it is just a bit easier to make more wooden arguments as
well as more thoughtful ones. For here one can also occasionally get by
through appeal to that simple focal point known as the "sovereign" (as
represented by the legislature), or to the putatively "plain meanings" of the
words that the sovereign has employed in formulating the positive law, or
again both. But it is only through absent-mindedness, facile shortsightedness, or cynicism that domestic lawyers can fail to note that lumpish
arguments of that form rest ultimately upon more "first principle," "higher
law" premises of the sort to which transnational lawyers must more often
explicitly appeal. And it is only through the same shortcomings that
anyone fails to note that transnational legal standards and processes also are
rapidly gaining on their domestic counterparts where the conspicuous
positive legal focal points-in this case treaties, tribunals, and regulatory
bodies-that enable more wooden forms of argumentation are concerned.
So much, then, for now, for the moral obilgatoriness aspect of law's
bindingness. As for the practical suasion aspect of that bindingness, the
story of transnational law's-that is, intergovernmentally formulated moral
46.
The "moral law" figures in the work both of Kant himself and of his interpreters as a
rough synonym for Kant's celebrated "categorical imperative." See, e.g., H. J. PATON, THE MORAL
LAW: KANT's 'GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS' 9 (1964). For more on Kant's
rootedness in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and cognitivist Natural Law traditions, for example, see NANCY
SHERMAN, MAKING A NECESSITY OF VIRTUE: ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON VIRTUE I (2d ed. 1997);
CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION 14 (2009); and the quite remarkable STEPHEN
ENGSTROM, THE FORM OF PRACTICAL REASON: A STUDY OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE ix (2009).
47.
See Paretians,supra note 38, at 440-42, 468-76. See also Robert Hockett, The Analytics
ofDistribution,59 EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2010).
48.

See id.

49.
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standards'-success in actually guiding action is, like that of domestic
law's, ultimately an empirical one. And this particular empirical story,
involving as it does actual human behavior, is accordingly also a highly
interpretive one. One must attend, in other words, not only to what those
who have acted in the names of their states have done, but also to why they
apparently have done what they have done.
Now as I documented elsewhere, Limits was spectacularly thin when it
came to this empirical story, both in its simple narratival and in its
interpretive aspects. And that was hardly surprising in view of the thin
theoretical gruel that book offered, for the interpretive enterprise always
rests on the theoretical one. In critiquing Limits on this score, I also
highlighted the much richer theoretical and interpretive work done by other
scholars of transnational law, especially in recent years, and called for more
such work. It is accordingly with some delight that I turn now to the "case
study" side of Power & Purpose's contribution. For this aspect of the book
is very rich indeed, and clearly reflective of the great wealth of actual
experience Professor O'Connell has had not only as a theorist, but as a
practicing transnational lawyer endowed with a particularly striking
capacity for reflection upon her own practice.
VIII. CASES INPOlNT: LAW'S PRINCIPLED,
PURPOSEFUL POWER INACTION

Because Power & Purpose's point of entry into transnational legal
theory and practice is the nulla lege sine poena canard regularly floated by
transnational law skeptics, its case studies understandably focus on
instances in which transnational legal standards are enforced. Several
features of this discussion, which occupies the second of the book's two
Parts,50 bear notice. One is its sheer breadth. The range of subject matters
of the transnational standards in question-from economic relations to
airspace regulation to terrorist-harboring and war-is itself testament to
how many spheres of human activity have become the subject of
transnational efforts at cooperation.s' Another is the great variety of forms
that transnational efforts at enforcing transnational legal standards can take.
From armed force to sanctions to lawsuits, sometimes pursued collectively
or in collectively organized fora, and sometimes pursued individually or in
domestic fora with collective authorization, the menu of means through
which transnational standards are vindicated proves impressively rich.52

50.

O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 151-368.

51.

Id.
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Id.
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What is perhaps most noteworthy of all, however, is how transparently
the substantive standards concerning all of these varied spheres of human
activity, and the procedural standards governing all of the varied means of
enforcing those substantive standards, manifest joint effort on the part of
nation states to further a global rule of law bearing the "higher law"-rooted
formal features discussed above. A conspicuous case in point is the
evolution of transnational law governing the use of armed force by states.
Power & Purpose notes that from the beginnings in natural law treatises on
down through the codification of natural law principles in positive treaties,
the aim of the law governing force has been to ensure that it only be
employed justly. 53
Understanding of what justice requires in such cases has,
unsurprisingly, developed from less to more plausible over time-just as
have, for example, both transnational and domestic understandings of what
justice requires in respect of inter-ethnic relations. 4 And what this natural
development has meant for war is a gradually developed appreciation,
manifest increasingly in opinion and action alike, of two precepts. The first
is that armed action must never be initiated; it may only be reactive, and in
that sense justifiable by reference to something like what domestic lawyers
routinely recognize as the "necessity" defense.55 The second is that such
defensive action must always be narrowly tailored to doing no more than is
required to restore the status quo ante to the armed aggression that
instigates it; there must be "proportionality" between enforcement action on
the one hand, and the injury that prompts enforcement on the other. 6
The source of these guidelines is of course Aristotelian ethical theory
as developed by natural lawyers over the course of the medieval and early
modern periods, a mode of thought in which the three forms of generality
discussed above are conspicuous.57 The destination of those guidelines, for
its part, Power & Purpose shows to have been a steadily strengthened
sequence of treaties and tribunals, culminating most conspicuously in the
U.N. Charter and the International Court of Justice, that codify and enforce
them. Power & Purpose does not flinch from acknowledging that these
standards often are honored as much in the breech -at least by individual
states-as in conformity. 9 But to claim that violation of law means no law,
53.

Id. at 153-92.

54.
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O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 153-92.

56.

Id.

57.

See, e.g., HOCKETr, supranote 29, at 60-108.

58.

O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 153-92.

59.

See, e.g., id. at 166-69.

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

92

[Vol. 17:1

it makes plain, is little more than to indulge a non sequitur. What matters
are the linked facts: 1) action out of conformity with these norms no longer
is generally considered legitimate; and 2) apparently in significant part for
that very reason, states that used regularly to act as if "all is fair in
diplomacy and war" no longer do so.
That there remains distance to travel does not undercut the claim that
the journey is both directed, in keeping with familiar higher law principles,
and well underway. And that latter observation is particularly well born out
in the story, also told in Power & Purpose, of multilateral armed action
taken by states, as distinguished from unilateral such actions.60 Gone,
apparently, are the days in which coalitions of states join together to seize
land or other resources from other states. In only two brief cases since the
1940s have such actions been so much as considered.6 1 And in those cases
it is striking that, even though the attackers were in many ways "rogue"
states, there was at least some basis at that time for taking their leaders to
believe sincerely, if incorrectly, that it was their homeland that had been the
object of ingress.62
A story strikingly similar to that of the evolution of guidelines
governing armed action is that of the evolution of guidelines governing
retaliation against perceived wrongs falling short of attack or invasion.
Rather as Chapters Four and Five of Power & Purpose respectively tell the
unilateral and multilateral renditions of the tale of that first evolution, so do
Chapters Six and Seven tell those of that of the second. Once again we
learn that the standards that evolved here first emerged from the natural law
tradition, then ultimately came to be codified in positive treaties
enforceable either by multilateral organizations or in multilateral
tribunals. 4
Moreover, we find that the same two basic substantive standards found
in the armed action case-those of non-initiation and proportional
response-figure prominently in the non-armed action case as well.65 The
sorts of transaction covered by this area of transnational law of course come
in many more flavors than do armed action. They include such matters as
air transport arrangements, riparian rights, trade relations, diplomatic
relations, action on the high seas, and all manner of other familiar human

60.

Id. at 193-228.
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Id.
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O'CONNELL, supra note 25, at 153-228, 229-94.
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But what these all have saliently in common so far as our
transaction.
story is concerned is their consonance with the formal features
characteristic of the rule of law reprised above.
Here too, in other words, as in the case of the law governing use of
force, we find steady development from a world system subject to, though
not always acting in conformity with, higher law principles, toward a world
system increasingly acting in conformity to those same higher law
principles as given positive expression in formal documents and formally
constituted legal institutions. Against this backdrop, Power & Purpose's
last two chapters afford a fitting wrap-up. For the story of these chapters is
that of transnational legal standards increasingly finding effect through the
Chapter Eight covers multilateral such
actions of formal tribunals.
covers the role of transnational legal
Nine
Chapter
tribunals, while
standards in domestic courts.
In one sense, the latter is a very old story, in that for centuries it has
been common for national legal systems to incorporate "the Law of
Nations" into the domestic law given effect in their courts.68 In another
sense, however, this old story has been refreshed by the proliferation and
steadily growing authority of international tribunals. For that latter
development, by dint both of its affording more positive formality to
international legal standards, and of its affording an impartial (as between
nations) source of precedent in interpreting those standards, turns out to
have suffused international law even as applied in domestic courts with
additional vitality.69 And it is perhaps in this very symbiosis between
rapidly developing international tribunals on the one hand, and domestic
courts on the other, that lawyers will find their hopeful efforts on behalf of
the development of a transnational rule of law most vindicated. For here
we find the associated jurisdictional phenomena of "confederation" and
"subsidiarity," so long familiar first to the Netherlandish, Swiss, and
American unions and now increasingly to the European, at long last
actively on its way to our global polity.
IX. JUST SAY "No"-AGAIN: THE NAY-SAYERS HAVE ANOTHER Go

While Power & Purpose affords a rich, broad, historically nuanced
stocktaking of our grounds for optimism concerning the prospect of a
robust global rule of law, it would have been sanguine to expect it to serve

66.

Id. at 229-94.
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as the "last word" on this subject even for a very brief period. And as it
happens, there is already out now a rejoinder of sorts from the nay-saying
quarter. I refer in this case to Eric Posner's Perils of Global Legalism
(Perils), 70 which serves in effect as postscript to the aforementioned Limits.
In that capacity, the book does not offer much of anything new relative toanything, as we might put it, "beyond the"-Limits. What it does do is
subtly to shift the target of its skepticism-from global law, which was the
subject of Limits, to what I am here calling the global "rule of law," which
is the subject of Power & Purpose. For the new book no longer disavows
international law as such, so much as it repudiates something the author
calls "international legalism," 7' and the latter, we will see, is described
much as I have described the rule of law. It does bear noting, however, that
the scholars at whom Perils takes aim, a few of them now finally named,7 2
appear to remain those who were targeted by Limits. They are established
scholar-practitioners of transnational law who believe in their enterprise
and its continuing development.
Before more fully explicating the subtle shift in targeting that occurs
between Limits and Perils, let me first say a bit about why it is that I claim
that the latter nevertheless offers little if anything new beyond Limits. The
thrust of the story told in Limits, recall, was that what masquerades as
international law is in fact epiphenomenal." International law was said to
be no more than the outward form taken by behavioral regularities, devoid
of independent "normative pull," that emerge like holograms from
transactions which occur mainly between pairs of states that always are
acting to "maximize" their "interests."74 The bilateral transactions in
question, for their part, were represented as one-off affairs by the static
"models" hurriedly sketched throughout Limits.7 5
Each of these
characteristics of Limits' story-"interests" and "maximization" taken for
independent variables, and "models" and "case studies" that incorporated
bilaterality and comparative statics while assuming-away multilaterality
and ignoring the prospect of intertemporal dynamics-proved in the end to
kill the book's prospects as an advancement of knowledge or
understanding.
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ERic A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009) [hereinafter PERILS].

71.

See id. at 16-27.

72.

More on these scholars presently.

73.

See supra Part III.

74.

See Limits of Their World, supra note 9, at 1729-39.

75.

Id.

76.

See supra Part HII.

Hockett

2010]

95

To begin with, the independent variable in the Limits story"interests"-was never pinned down, in any of Limits' putatively distinct
"models" or "case studies." States' "interests," unpacked without comment
as states' "preferences," were effectively imputed to states post hocindeed, ad hoc-after what those states actually did had been narrated,
rather than antecedently on the basis of independent empirical evidence.n
This was old line "revealed preference" with a vengeance-the vengeance
in this case having been wrought on the enterprise we call empirical
explanation. 8 What purported to be the independent variable, in other
words, was not independently established, but instead was rendered entirely
dependent on the outcomes they were meant with the theoretical apparatus
to predict.79 And this, of course, deprived the "models" of any capacity to
"explain" behavior.
The putative "theory" was instead altogether
tautologous or, to employ the more "plain vanilla" term leveled
prodigiously by Limits and Perils alike at "traditional" scholars,
"circular." 8'
Second and relatedly, partly because "interest" was never
determinately pinned down, the concept of "maximization" never found
content in Limits either.82 Where we do not know what the maximandum
is, we do not know precisely what "maximizing" consists in. That gap was
exacerbated by Limits' abstention from attending in any way to the matters
of commensuration and aggregation.83 The authors sensibly asserted that
states are at least in some sense understandable as groupings of persons,
and then just as sensibly acknowledged that states' citizens typically have
many, often conflicting, interests.84 But to say these things and then say
that you will simply assume that citizens' interests-themselves never
pinned down-are "aggregated in some way" by a state which then acts to
"maximize" the resultant aggregandum, as Limits did, just is to relinquish
the use of state "interest maximization" as an independently explanatory
variable. So Limits effectively abandoned the project of empirically
explaining anything before its attempt had even got underway, and yet the
authors nevertheless proceeded on their merry way to purport to explain
many things indeed, and to do so more effectively than the unnamed
77.

See Limits of Their World, supranote 9, at 1729-39.
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"traditional" scholars of international law whose work they deemed
"vague" and "conclusory."85
Third, while we are on the subject of "conclusoriness," Limits' claim
that states tend to interact only bilaterally rather than multilaterally to create
and conform to transnational legal standards was effectively assumed rather
than proved in the work, notwithstanding the authors' purporting to "show"
this. The assumption came in the form of Limits' "models," all of which
were in the nature of primitive two person games of the kind regularly
encountered in undergraduate game theory texts.16 It has all too often
proved apt to say, in connection with some pseudo-theories or prototheories that masquerade as full theories, that when all you have is a
hammer, everything looks like a nail. Limits afforded yet another such apt
occasion for this adage by in effect filtering out, through the structure of its
"models," the very phenomena that Limits purported to "prove" not to be
possible or to occur: multilateral cooperation in international lawmaking
and regime-constituting. Moreover, almost as if prompted by a taste for
self-subversion, the authors adduced as empirical "evidence" for their brief
on behalf of bilaterality and against multilaterality the fact that regionaland emphatically multilateral-groupings like North American Free Trade
Agreement and the European Union were proceeding alongside such global
groupings as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade
Organization and the U.N.87 It will perhaps not be surprising that no
argument was offered purporting to show that these regional groupings are
in any sense subversive of, as distinguished from complementary to and in
furtherance of, the gradual thickening of full global interlinkage.
Finally fourth, just as the bilateral structure of Limits' primitive
"models" blinkered the authors to multilaterality, so did the static nature of
those primitive "models" blinker them to that which is most interesting and

85. Id. Imagine, for example, a polity all or nearly all of whose citizens believe in the project
of an international rule of law, and who form preferences in keeping with that belief. Further, imagine
that the government of this polity, which is democratic, easily aggregates these citizens' normdetermined preferences, by dint of the unanimity, or near unanimity, that belief in a transnational rule of
law enjoys in this polity (perhaps it is a Scandinavian polity). This would be a polity in which
transnational law exerted what Goldsmith and Posner call "normative pull" upon citizens, and hence
upon those citizens' democratic government. The polity's resultant actions taken in conformity with
transnational law would both 1) fully conform to the "theory," such as it is, that Limits proffers; and 2)
flatly contradict what Goldsmith and Posner assert throughout Limits that their theory "predicts." What
makes that possible is not that Goldsmith and Posner's "theory" was incoherent, but that it lacked
independent variables and was accordingly tautologous, predictive of literally nothing at all.
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important about the development of transnational law-its dynamic,
evolutionary nature. 89 This was particularly surprising, if for no other
reason than that iterative, evolutionary norm-generation is a commonplace
even in game theory texts of the sort that one would have assumed the
authors of Limits to have read-at least those beyond the undergraduate
level. 90
But it also was surprising because the phenomena of
"development" and "process" have for decades been among those attributes
of transnational legality most regularly seized upon and critically examined
by scholars and practitioners seeking to understand and improve
transnational law.9 1
Even the most carefully thinking of legal positivists, Herbert Hart,
rested his own cautious compliments and hopes for international law on its
character as a work in progress.92 It is also a commonplace among that
most empirically sensitive of schools of transnational legal scholarshipthe "New Haven School," oddly never so much as mentioned in Limits or,
now, Perils-that transnational law as we currently find it, replete as it is
with norms rooted in practice and what lawyers forthrightly call "custom,"
For a putative new "theory"
amounts to a "global constitutive process."
of international law, then, to traffic in comparative statics and ignore
dynamics was not only to engage in a strange sort of self-exile from actual
practice and the actual world in all of its intertemporal richness, but to be
bizarrely perverse.
X. NOT MUCH MORE TO SAY: THE PARTICULAR "PERILS" OF POSNER

Against this backdrop, in addition to that supplied above in discussion
of Power & Purpose, Posner's new Perils proves to be a bit depressingly
"already said" in character. For the book in large measure makes the very
same assertions as its predecessor, without making any attempt to fill the
fatal lacunae just rehearsed. Reliance is still placed upon still undefined
state "interests," with no attempt to make a bonafide independent variable
of this defacto dependent variable. 94 The same holds of "maximization" as
relied upon by Perils.95 There is no more attempt here than in Limits to
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See id. at 1720-23, 1729-39.

90. See, e.g., JORGEN WEIBULL, EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY xiii (1995); HERB GINTis,
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make sense of this term by reference to any method at all-let alone a
plausible one-of commensurating and aggregating citizen or other substate "interests." Bilaterality, too, is once again simply assumed, in that
most illustrative transactions that figure into the discussion are state-tostate. Dynamic interaction among multiple states, along with the evolution
and development to which ongoing interaction gives rise, likewise is
essentially ignored as in Limits, albeit with one exception: for we now find
that one word that, with its cognates, is often associated with both domestic
and transnational legal dynamics-"process"-should be considered an
occasion for derision, as in "legalism loves procedures."96 There is, in fact,
a very good reason that procedure-which I doubt anyone "loves" any
more than they love constitutions that include due process clauses-figures
prominently in transnational legal scholarship and practice, but of that in a
moment as I turn now to the one thing that Perils does differently than
Limits did.
In what sense, then, does Perils add value or disvalue as compared to
Limits? Well, as I suggested, the only change that it introduces takes the
form of a subtle shift of target. Now it is less international law that comes
in for skepticism, than it is something the author calls "international
legalism." What, you might ask, is that? Well, we are told, it is "a
complicated and ambiguous concept, and any attempt to reduce it to a
definition is hazardous."9 7 It's a bit, in other words, like "interests" and
"maximization." But there are a few characteristic features that prove to be
helpful in pinning it down. There are three in particular. One is the belief
that "rules . . . issued in advance of the behavior they regulate," should

"prevail over power." 98 Another is the belief that nonpartisan judges should
be those who apply rules, and that they should do so impartially. 99 And
finally, the third is that there should be well defined, regulative procedures
that ensure that disputes are resolved fairly pursuant to the rules under
which disputes are brought before judges.100 Thus characterized, "global
legalism" is indubitably a transnationally operative "rule of law" as I
characterized it above.
So what, you might now ask, is "perilous" about the ideal of a
transnational rule of law? Perils is quite obscure about this. The closest
one finds to a determinate answer is Madisonian in flavor: Perils tells us
that law tends to be respected only when it is well formulated, widely
96.

See id. at 20.

97.

Id. at 19.

98.

Id.
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accepted, and well enforced.' 0 ' Since transnational institutions such as we
have them thus far are imperfect in respect of their democratic nature, the
clarity of their norms, the effectiveness of their enforcement, and the
compliance of their subjects, the argument runs, transnational law will not
tend to be respected. And that is in essence the whole of the main
argument. There is also a subsidiary argument, to the effect that some
matters are best handled by politics rather than law, which global legalists
are said not to understand. 0 2 I will briefly address each of these lines of
argument in turn.
The first line of criticism amounts to a puzzling brief in at least two
respects. First, we are never told why less than fully respected law is worse
than no law at all, hence why transnational law's not-yet-surmounted
shortcomings should count as reasons to abandon work toward a more fully
completed transnational rule of law. After all, the Madisonian argument
against legislating ineffectual laws presupposed a legislature which also
legislates effectual ones-a legislature which accordingly stands to lose
Yet, part of Perils' brief against
something by over-legislating.
"international legalism" is precisely the absence of any global legislature.
It is accordingly obscure who it is that stands to lose something, and whom
the author prefers not lose that thing, in the transnational case.
Second, the claim that transnational rule of law should not be pursued
if it cannot be brought into being in one fell swoop would seem to imply
that it should not be pursued or hoped for at all. For as anyone who is not
blinkered by static rather than dynamic models will immediately
understand, there is no place where some semblance of the rule of law can
be found, that did not make its way there gradually, and haltingly, over
time.
There is always ground to cover, in real time, on the road from brutish
anarchy, to the rule of personal, familial, local, or national whim, to the
domestic rule of law, on up to the transnational rule of law. And it is
simply to lack an appreciation of how the world or any part of it works, not
to say sense, to suggest that unless we can teleport to the ideal end state
from where we now are, we should not attempt even to step toward or
commence the journey en route to it. At least that is so if one cannot
specify a sense in which half a loaf is worse than none; and Perils does not
bother even to assert, let alone argue, that more multilaterality short of full
universality is worse than no multilaterality or bilaterality. So we are once
again left puzzling here, as we were with Limits, as to just what it is the
author thinks we should do, or even not do. All we are left with is some
101.
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indication of whose putatively pious pronouncements we should smirk at.
More on that matter in a moment.
The second subsidiary line of objection to a global rule of law found in
Perils rides on the idea that some things are best left to "politics" or even
"morality" rather than law. 03 A claim of this form makes some sense. At
least that is so in regard to some "inherently contestable" moral matters,
within a domestic polity where the rule of law is well established, and there
are clear lines of institutional distinction between morals and politics on the
one hand, and law on the other. It makes sense, in other words, where
lawmaking and law enforcement are sufficiently well regularized as to
allow for an at least workaday form of positivism: a regime in which the
positive law's rootedness in moral vision and political decision can
occasionally-for example, in cases other than "hard" cases-without harm
be overlooked, and decisions rendered on the basis of cursory glances at
statutory language or prior court opinions. It makes considerably less
sense, however, where the rule of law has not yet been secured in that
fashion, and where the distinctions among law, politics, and morals
accordingly remain more porous-which is largely the situation in which
we still find transnational law, as discussed above in connection with Power
& Purpose.'"
Perils' appeal to those distinctions in arguing against a global rule of
law is accordingly out of place. For the appeal's actual appeal presupposes
that a robust rule of law is already secured, and is thereafter apt only in
respect of a limited class of charged moral disagreements not yet amenable
to "legalization" and "judicialization." Those who seek a more robust
global rule of law-the scholars and practitioners unnamed but sniped at in
Limits, and finally named in a few cases in Perils 0 5 -look forward in
joyful hope to the day when it will actually make sense to debate whether
this or that isolated moral controversy is yet ripe for judicial treatment or
should instead be left with the legislative process or with individuals in
their private capacities. That leaves one final thing to note in connection
with Perils.
As suggested a moment ago, Perils does represent an advance on
Limits in at least now naming a few of those "traditional" scholars whom
we are meant to disregard. It sets its sites on Harold Koh, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, and Kal Raustiala in particular."'" I will not tax the reader here
with a repetition of the rich-and distinct-contributions of these authors,
103.
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partly because of space constraints and partly because Perils levels by and
large the same attack upon all three of them. What is their shared
shortcoming, then? It is that their empirically rich accounts of the internal
workings of diplomatic offices in the first case, and those of interregulatory networks among subnational units of state on the other, are
"vague." 0 7
The meaning of "vague" as employed in these charges is, alas, a bit
vague. As best I can tell, the word serves as a synonym for "empirically
rich," hence "subtle." Or it serves as a shorthand mode of recognition that
what "traditional" international law scholars like the Chayes', Koh,
Raustalia, and Slaughter concern themselves with is not so much discrete
acts of transnational norm-compliance as the transnational law-making,
law-abiding, and hence order-establishing process.08 It is, in other words,
to complain of attentions being paid to precisely that dynamic character of
the evolving transnational rule of law which Limits ignored.' 09
But this of course is hardly a complaint. Indeed it ought to be-and
perhaps is-a source of envy. For to break open the "black box" of the
state is precisely what is needed in order to arrive at a bona fide
independent variable that we might independently establish and thus use in
explaining a dependent variable-state action. And that is, of course,
precisely what is most conspicuously lacking both in Limits and, alas, now
in Perils as well, notwithstanding the lip service now abundantly paid in the
latter to the "disaggregated state.'"o

107. See id. at 41, 71, 73-76 ("Too much methodological complexity renders predictionmaking impossible."). I should note that it is gratifying to see the author at least addressing
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XI. CONCLUSION: FORWARD, WITH THE
POWER OF PRINCIPLED PURPOSE, WE Go

It is time now that I conclude, at least for the present. As I write these
words, global concentrations of atmospheric carbon, and with them global
temperatures and sea levels, are in the process of rising. Massive
dislocation of human populations as well as of cities and agriculture, not to
mention of threatening flora and fauna, are predicted consequences."' Peak
oil for its part appears to have been reached, while petroleum
consumption-and with it, the likelihood of conflict over dwindling
supplies-is rapidly rising, especially in nations with populations much
larger by orders of magnitude than that of the United States."12
Meanwhile, global trade relations have gone into dramatic, and
persistent imbalance, which in turn has led not only directly to mass
unemployment in established industrial states, but also indirectly to yet
more unemployment and additional threats-by fostering the amassing of
huge surpluses of capital, directed by states and their sovereign wealth
funds, in search of global rents." 3 For that search now has fed into two
massive credit bubbles in rapid succession, whose collapses have recently
thrown the global finance economy, and with it the real economy, into
disarray and slump.114
Unemployment rates, losses of health insurance and other
determinants of personal security, toxic imports, and illegal but
understandable attempts at cross-border migration have been steadily rising,
and as they have risen, faith in economic globalization has correspondingly
fallen."l5 At the same time, global terror networks continue to expand
operations, and weapons and other technologies of mass destruction appear
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to be on the verge of further proliferation across borders-including in the
direction of "rogue" elements.' 16
Call me a Cassandra if you like, but these developments strike me as
what one might call "perilous." But they are also addressable. To sensible
people-not just legal scholars and practitioners-these addressable perils
call out for joint cooperative action by all of the world's inhabitants and
those who act in their name. Such action never tends to be forthcoming
save when explicitly justified by reference to impartial, generally applicable
principles-the kinds of reasons that conduce to regularity and fairness in
transnational relations.' 17 And that is to say that such action both requires,
and amounts to, action taken toward and consistent with the realization of
rule of law values.
The publication of Power & Purpose is accordingly to be celebrated at
the stage of global development at which we now find ourselves. As for
Perils-well, let us celebrate its publication as well. For it illustrates very
nicely those very forms of snide nay-saying and cynical hopelessness that
we must repudiate and step past if we are ever to get anywhere worth going.
Professor Posner's book is, in the final analysis, the very peril against
which it purports to warn us, by dint of the futile solipsism and inaction it
foments in the face of real perils. And Professor O'Connell's book,
happily, affords promise against precisely that peril.
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